The Quality of the Judges Is What Counts in the End by Gibbons, John L.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 61
Issue 1
SYMPOSIUM:
The Sixth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture
Article 2
1-1-1995
The Quality of the Judges Is What Counts in the
End
John L. Gibbons
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
John L. Gibbons, The Quality of the Judges Is What Counts in the End, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 45 (1995).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol61/iss1/2
THE QUALITY OF THE JUDGES
IS WHAT COUNTS IN TEE END'
John J. Gibbonst
I am very pleased to be here for several reasons. First, it
presents the opportunity to participate in a lecture series
memorializing Abraham Pomerantz. I never encountered Mr.
Pomerantz in practice but Colins J. Seitz, who was my chief
judge for a good part of my tenure on the United States Court
of Appeals, knew Abe Pomerantz well, and had an Abe
Pomerantz story for every occasion. Judge Seitz was, and is
still, a great admirer of this tremendously innovative, powerful
lawyer, and frequently held out Abe Pomerantz as a role model
for law clerks in our court.
The second reason I am pleased to be here is that it has
given me an opportunity to read, in advance of publication, an
excellent Article on the subject of specialized courts. I can add
very little to what Professor Dreyfuss has said on that subject.
While addressing the role of specialized courts generally,
Professor Dreyfuss focuses on the pending legislative proposal
in Pennsylvania for a business court that would handle, in the
language of the statute, "all cases involving corporations and
other associations, mercantile and commercial matters, or the
employment of directors and officers of corporations and other
associations."' The pending bill, as she notes, would staff the
proposed court with judges appointed by the governor, with the
advice and consent of the senate. These judges would be
selected from a list submitted by a nominating commission,
with no more than a majority of judges from the same party.2
Professor Dreyfuss postulates that the purpose of the
Pennsylvania proposal may be to create a specialized tribunal
* © 1995 John J. Gibbons. All Rights Reserved.
t Richard J. Hughes Professor of Constitutional Law, Seton Hall University
Law School Retired Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Pa. S.J. Res. 309, 178th Gen. Assemb., Regular Session § 20(a) (1993-94).
2 Id § 22; PA. CONST. art IV, § 8.
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that would achieve the notable acceptance that the Delaware
Chancery Court has achieved.3 She concludes, and I certainly
agree, that it is unlikely to achieve this goal.4 The difference
in size and population between the two states, as well as the
other historical and cultural differences that she notes are sim-
ply too great to expect that Pennsylvania's proposed court will
accomplish for Pennsylvania what Delaware Chancery has
done for Delaware's fisc and for the wealth of its bar.
Besides Delaware Chancery, the other specialized courts
that command Professor Dreyfuss's attention include: the
Federal Circuit, in which patent appeals are concentrated; the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, which had limited
subject matter jurisdiction over disputes arising under the
federal price control legislation; and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, which had the task of issuing search
warrants for foreign intelligence law-enforcement purposes.
Professor Dreyfuss's Article suggests two points that
warrant further consideration. First, is that a study of the
functioning of specialized courts should take into account more
courts than the three federal and one state tribunal that she
considers. At the state level, the courts that come most readily
to mind are those that in many jurisdictions are referred to as
"family courts". A study of the functioning of many of these
specialized courts, applying Professor Dreyfuss's criteria of
quality of the decisionmiaking, efficiency, and due process'
would produce disconcerting results. I have not made such a
study, but anecdotal evidence from community legal service
lawyers and others suggests that many family courts, while
efficient in disposing of large numbers of cases, are rather
short on quality of decisionmaking, efficiency and due process.
The bankruptcy courts in each federal district also come to
mind. These, too, administer a specialized subject matter,
although they must also adjudicate a broad range of legal
issues, especially in their jurisdiction over Chapter Eleven
cases. The bankruptcy courts are the largest and most
important group of specialized federal courts in the United
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts
in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1995).
4 Id. at 24.
5 Id. at 11.
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States. In contrast with my anecdotal knowledge about family
courts, my first-hand experience reviewing the decisions of
bankruptcy courts leads me to conclude that as measured by
Professor Dreyfuss's criteria of quality of decisionm=adng,
efficiency and due process, they are remarkably successful, at
least in the Third Circuit.
It is true, of course, that the bankruptcy courts are
supervised by appellate tribunals that themselves are courts of
general rather than of specialized jurisdiction. As Professor
Dreyfuss points out in her Article,' that is also true of
Delaware Chancery-its decisions are reviewed by the
Supreme Court of that state. But it is true as well of the
family courts, about which I, at least, have a good deal less
enthusiasm than I have for bankruptcy courts.
That brings me to my second point: a court's success in
delivering quality decisionmaking efficiently and with due
process has nothing to do with whether the court is or is not
specialized. Rather, courts are successful because the judges in
those courts are selected and appointed by a process that
selects high-quality jurists more often than not. Certainly, that
is true of the selection process for bankruptcy judges. Absent
such a selection process, courts, specialized or generalist, will
not satisfy Professor Dreyfuss's criteria.
As early as 1937, the American Bar Association addressed
the problem of judicial selection and tenure, declaring its
opposition to the unfortunately common practice of electing
judges.7 At that time, in contrast with the practice of
appointing judges who served during good behavior that
prevailed in the Federal system, the direct election of judges
was the method pursued in most of the states, including
Pennsylvania.'
Direct election was not the method pursued by
Pennsylvania's southern neighbor, Delaware, or by its eastern
neighbor, New Jersey. At least in judicial selection, these two
states never succumbed to the Jacksonian revolution.9 Indeed,
r Id. at 7.
7 62 A.BL. Rev. 893-897 (1937).
" See INIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 6-12 (Arthur T.
Vanderbilt ed., 1949) [hereinafter "MINIMUM STANDARDSI.
9 Legal historians generally associate the movement toward an elected
judiciary with the ideas of popular sovereignty espoused by the Jacksonian
1995]
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Delaware's Constitution of 1897 not only provided for
appointed rather than elected judges, but also specified that a
majority of the judges not be from the same political party."0
In New Jersey, an almost 150-year-old tradition dictates
similar bipartisan selection of appointed judges." No governor
has dared to depart from it. Yet despite the efforts of
prominent Pennsylvania lawyers, many of whom were leaders
of the American Bar, the movement to remove the unfortunate
legacy of Jacksonian democracy from the Pennsylvania judicial
system never made any progress. Every effort to change the
elected judiciary provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution
from 1937 to date has been ineffective.
In the heyday of the great political bosses, although judges
ran for election in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the actual
selection often was made by the dominant political leadership.
Occasionally those bosses, who frequently shared interests
with the economic movers and shakers in the states, made
rather fine selections: a Curtis Bok or a Sam Roberts in
Pennsylvania; a Benjamin Cardozo or a Charles Desmond in
New York. Because the bosses made the selection, usually
judges were not forced to raise money for political action
committees to finance seriously contested elections.
The ameliorative role of political bosses, of course, ended
not too long after Baker v. Carr began the reapportionment
revolution in American politics. 2 As the bosses' influence
declined, the position of judges in those states with elective
judgeship provisions began to depend on the electorate more
directly. Those judges were forced to raise money and to spend
time campaigning for office.
The effects, especially in Pennsylvania, were unfortunate.
The reputation of Pennsylvania's entire judiciary declined-a
decline probably warranted by their level of performance. From
top to bottom, the Pennsylvania state court system fails to
Democrats in the first half of the nineteenth century.
10 DEL. CONST., art. IV § 3; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 1303(d),
1702(a); 9221 (1974). One can see where the drafters of the proposed Pennsylvania
statute got their idea.
" See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 8, at 9.
12 369 U.S. 186 (1961) (holding that malapportionment is a justiciable issue
and leading to the one person one vote cases that transformed the American
political landscape).
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engender confidence. Not long ago we witnessed the disedifying
spectacle of a sitting supreme court justice attending
fundraising events for an opponent of one of his own judicial
colleagues who was running for reelection. Later that justice
was impeached and removed from office for improprieties not
related to political fundraising. Similarly, at the common pleas
level performance falls far short of the standards by which
Professor Dreyfuss defines a court's success. The only bright
spot that I see in an otherwise dismal Pennsylvania judiciary
is the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court created in the 1968
Constitution Convention. The Commonwealth Court is an
elected specialized court having original and appellate
jurisdiction over cases in which Pennsylvania's local
government units have a significant interest.
Every effort at systemic reform in Pennsylvania with
respect to judicial appointments in recent years has been
defeated. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that business and
corporate representatives would try to achieve some sort of
systemic reform: namely, routing cases in which business and
corporate interests are parties to some forum other than the
existing Pennsylvania state courts. It seems clear that these
interests now are willing to settle for a little reform, rather
than the system-wide reform that has been the object of the
prior unsuccessful efforts to improve the Pennsylvania
judiciary. Nor is it the least bit surprising that the proposed
legislation would depart from Pennsylvania's Jacksonian
tradition of judicial selection by providing both for a
nominating commission and for appointment by the governor
with the advice and consent of the senate.
That provision is, I think, the most important feature of
the Pennsylvania proposal. It carries with it the hope that the
proposed court will, at least initially, be staffed by quality
jurists. Because the bill yields to political practicalities by
providing for a retention election at some point, 3 however,
how long such a reform will last is indeterminable.
If the bill passes, will the judges of Pennsylvania's
Chancery Corporations Court achieve for Pennsylvania the
benefits that the Delaware Chancery Court confers on that
state? Professor Dreyfuss makes a persuasive case against the
" Pa. S.J. Res. 309, § 22(d); PA. CONST. art. 5, § 15(b).
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likelihood of such an outcome. 4 It is entirely likely, however,
that those jurists will outperform the judges of the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. Indeed, it seems a
virtual certainty.
Still, the objection remains that the ordinary people of
Pennsylvania desire and deserve generalized courts of as high
a quality as the proposed specialized courts devoted to specific
parties and issues. Creating a specialized court for those
parties and issues may have the undesirable effect of removing
powerful interest groups from the battle for systemwide reform
of the selection method for the state's courts, and therefore
could delay such sorely needed reform.
Perhaps these issues warrant another solution entirely. In
the late 1940's, experts on judicial administration like Arthur
T. Vanderbilt were urging not only the elimination of elected
judgeships, but also the adoption of unitary court systems."
The unitary court concept proposed that no court such as the
Delaware Chancery Court should exist. In the New Jersey
Constitution of 1947, that reform was partially achieved when
the old supreme court (a law court), the court of chancery, the
prerogative court, and the old circuit courts all were merged
into a single superior court. 6 The 1947 Constitution
temporarily left county courts, county district courts and
juvenile and domestic relations courts in place,1 7 but
eventually all were abolished by subsequent constitutional
amendments. 8 Today, above the municipal court level, and
below the level of the New Jersey Supreme Court, all judges
simply are appointed to the superior court.
Like Delaware, however, New Jersey had a strong history
of equity jurisprudence. It had a chancellor until 1947 and did
not lose the advantages of specialization in equity that
Professor Dreyfuss notes with respect to Delaware Chancery.
Under Vanderbilt's leadership, the constitution divided the
superior court into a chancery division, a law division and an
" Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 24-31.
I See, e.g., American Bar Association, Report of the Section of Judicial
Administration, reprinted in MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 8, app. a at 24-32.
18 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
17 N.J. CONST. art. 6, §§ 1, 3.
18 N.J. CONsT. art. 6, §§ 1, 3.
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appellate division.' Eventually the work of the county courts
was assigned to the law division, that of the county district
courts to a new law division special part, and that of the
juvenile and domestic relations court to a new chancery
division family part. Assignments to these divisions currently
are made by the chief justice, who can and does take into
account a judge's special knowledge and skill in specialized
areas. Moreover, under Vanderbilt's leadership, the New
Jersey Supreme Court resolved the jury trial issue, to which
Professor Dreyfuss makes reference."0 In Steiner v. Stein,2'
the court decided not to follow the United States Supreme
Court's lead in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westouer.' It held,
instead, that if any equitable claim in a case arises, a plaintiff
does not have a right to a jury trial. Finally, the Court
developed a broad "entire controversy" doctrine requiring that
all claims against all interested parties be joined in a single
action.'
I mention the New Jersey experience to make the point
that most of the advantages said to flow from specialized
courts are obtainable without the disadvantages that flow from
the multiplication of courts, court administrations, and court
facilities. For a state judicial system, a single court divided
into divisions according to some degree of subject matter
specialization seems a good deal sounder than the path
proposed for Pennsylvania in the pending legislation. But that
outcome is not likely in Pennsylvania. Indeed, the state's
political realities are likely to doom even the modest reform
proposed in the pending chancery corporation bill.
N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 3, 2 3.
20 Professor Dreyfuss notes, "Pennsylvania's removal of corporate and
commercial cases from the purview of the juror is bound to create problems."
Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 25. The problems relate to the constitutional right to a
jury trial in certain civil actions.
2' 66 A. 2d 367 (1949) (chancery division judges must decide all equitable
claims and all legal claims once equity jurisdiction is established).
2 395 U.S. 500 (1959) (if plaintiff seeks both legal and equitable relief it is
error to strike a demand for a jury trial).
See William J. Volonte, Note, The Entire Controuersy Doctrine, A Nouei
Approach to Judicial Efficiency, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 260 (1982).
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